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Abstract
Shafer’s belief functions were introduced in the seventies of the
previous century as a mathematical tool in order to model epistemic
probability. One of the reasons that they were not picked up by
mainstream probability was the lack of a behavioral interpretation. In
this paper we provide such a behavioral interpretation, and re-derive
Shafer’s belief functions via a betting interpretation reminiscent of the
classical Dutch Book Theorem for probability distributions. We relate
our betting interpretation of belief functions to the existing literature.
1 Introduction
Modern mainstream probability theory, be it aleatory or epistemic, is almost
exclusively based on the axioms of Kolmogorov, and we start our exposition
with quoting these axioms. We fix a finite set Ω of outcomes.
Definition 1.1 (Kolmogorov axioms). A function P : 2Ω → [0, 1] is a
probability distribution if it satisfies:
(P1) P (Ω) = 1 and P (∅) = 0;
(P2) For every every A,B ⊂ Ω we have
P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A ∩B). (1.1)
From an aleatory point of view, the axioms are often justified via
a frequentistic interpretation of probabilities. In such a frequentistic
interpretation, we take relative frequencies in repeated experiments as the
motivation and justification of the axioms.
From an epistemic point of view, the probability of an event A is often
interpreted as the degree of belief an agent has in a A. This degree of belief
can be quantified as the price for which the agent is willing to both buy and
sell a bet that pays out 1 if A turns out to be true. Using the Dutch Book
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argument this interpretation also leads to the Kolmogorov axiomatization,
as is well known.
However, degrees of belief cannot always be satisfactorily described with
the classical axioms of Kolmogorov, something which has been recognized
and confirmed by many researchers from such different disciplines as
mathematics [11, 12, 13, 1, 16], legal science [1], and philosophy (see
[6, 3, 4, 16] and references therein). These authors have argued that the
classical axioms of probability are too restrictive for at least two reasons:
1. It is impossible for an agent to distinguish between disbelief in A,
by which we mean P (Ac), and lack of belief, by which we mean 1 −
P (A). Especially when we interpret degree of belief in A as the degree
to which an agent has supporting evidence for A, lack of supporting
evidence for A is not necessarily supporting evidence for Ac.
2. It is impossible for an agent to suspend all judgment, that is, assigning
P (A) = P (Ac) = 0 is impossible. But certainly it is possible to have
no supporting evidence at all for either A or Ac. As an example,
consider a situation in which a man claims to be the father of a certain
child. A DNA test may or may not rule out the man as a potential
father of the child, but in any classical probabilistic computation one
has to start with a prior probability for the man to be the father.
Often one takes a fifty-fifty prior, but clearly this does not correspond
to our knowledge. Since we have no evidence for either fathership
or non-fathership, it would be more reasonable to assign zero prior
belief to both possibilities, something which is impossible under the
Kolmogorov axioms. (Uniform prior probabilities are also problematic
from another point of view: lumping states together or changing the
scale does not preserve uniformity, as is well known, see e.g. [11].)
These and similar considerations motivated Glenn Shafer [11] to intro-
duce belief functions, which were supposed to better capture the nature
of epistemic probability. To see how belief functions differ from classical
probability distributions, we note that it is well known that (P2) can be
expanded, for any collection of events A1, . . . , AN , into the well-known
inclusion-exclusion formula
P
(
N⋃
i=1
Ai
)
=
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
I 6=∅
(−1)|I|+1P
(⋂
i∈I
Ai
)
. (1.2)
In the Shafer axiomatization of belief functions, (1.2) is replaced by a
corresponding inequality.
Definition 1.2 (Shafer axioms ([11])). A function Bel : Ω→ [0, 1] is a belief
function provided that
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(B1) Bel(∅) = 0 and Bel(Ω) = 1;
(B2) For all A1, A2, . . . , AN ⊂ Ω, we have
Bel
(
N⋃
i=1
Ai
)
≥
∑
I⊆{1,...,N}
I 6=∅
(−1)|I|+1Bel
(⋂
i∈I
Ai
)
. (1.3)
One may at this point already loosely argue that the Shafer axioms are
indeed suitable for describing degrees of belief, as follows. Taking N = 2 in
(1.3) for simplicity gives Bel(A ∪ B) ≥ Bel(A) + Bel(B) − Bel(A ∩ B). A
loose interpretation now is as follows. If we have supporting evidence for
either A or B, then of course we have also supporting evidence of A ∪ B.
However, supporting evidence for both A and B is then counted twice and
must be subtracted on the right hand side. Now notice that it is possible
that there is supporting evidence for A∪B, but not for A or B individually,
leading to the inequality in the formula.
Shafer showed that belief functions have the following characterization.
Definition 1.3. A functionm : 2Ω → [0, 1] is called a basic belief assignment
if m(∅) = 0 and ∑
C⊆Ω
m(C) = 1. (1.4)
Theorem 1.4. A function Bel : 2Ω → [0, 1] is a belief function if and only
if there exists a basic belief assignment m such that
Bel(A) =
∑
C⊆A
m(C). (1.5)
There is a one-to-one correspondence between belief functions and basic
belief assignments, and Bel is a probability distribution if and only if m
concentrates on singletons.
In many situations, there is a natural candidate for the basic belief
assignment m, especially when the latter is obtained through a classical
probabilistic experiment.
Although belief functions are used in certain applied settings (see [2]
for a recent text), researchers in mainstream mathematics have essentially
stayed away from it. There are, roughly speaking, two reasons for this. First,
there were many critics (see the references in [12]) for which a theory about
uncertainty without a behavioral (betting) interpretation was unacceptable.
A second major point of concern is formulated in [10] and [5]. In both
references, the main reason to reject Shafer’s belief functions is that the
calculus of these belief functions, as put forward in the so called Dempster
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rule of combination to combine two belief functions into a new one, would
not be well founded or motivated, and would lead to unacceptable results.
The main goal of the current paper is to show how belief functions arise
form a natural betting interpretation, thereby taking away the first major
point of concern. We already mentioned above that classically, the degree
of belief an agent has in an event A, is interpreted as the price for which
he or she is willing to both buy and sell a bet that pays out 1 if A turns
out to be true. We argue, however, that a degree of belief an agent has in
an event A, should be interpreted as the maximum price for which he or
she is willing to buy (not necessarily sell) a bet that pays out 1 if A turns
out to be true. In our approach, the difference between buying and selling
is interpreted as the difference between disbelief and lack of believe that we
mentioned above. The distinction between buying and selling prices also
appears in the theory of Peter Walley [16], and below we comment on the
relation between his general approach and our theory.
We do not further comment on Dempster’s rule of combination for the
simple reason that we have no need for this rule, and we develop the theory
without it.
Other characterizations of belief functions exist in the literature, for
instance in the work of Smets [14]. We think our approach is more direct
than his, and as a result our characterization is much more concise (he has 10
requirements). Moreover, unlike Smets, we work in a betting interpretation,
so that our result can be seen as an analogue of the Dutch Book Theorem.
The paper is built up as follows. In Section 2 we develop our betting
theory, and in Section 3 we state and prove the betting interpretation of
belief functions. This section contains our main result Theorem 3.10.
2 Betting functions and degrees of belief
We approach belief behaviorally, working under the assumption that the
degree to which someone believes an event, can be measured by his or her
willingness to accept bets. To go towards a definition that we can work with
mathematically, we introduce betting functions.
Definition 2.1. A bet (or gamble) on Ω is a function X : Ω→ R. We write
X = RX for the collection of all bets on Ω. A betting function is a function
R : X → {0, 1} such that for each X ∈ X , there is an α0 ∈ R such that
R(X + α) = 0 for α < α0 and R(X + α) = 1 for α ≥ α0.
We interpret R as a function that indicates, for each bet X ∈ X , whether
or not an agent is willing to accept X, where we interpret R(X) = 1 as
‘willing to accept the bet’ and R(X) = 0 ‘not willing to accept the bet’.
The definition of a betting function justifies the following definition.
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Definition 2.2. Let R be a betting function. The buy function BuyR :
X → R is given by
BuyR(X) := max{α ∈ R : R(X − α) = 1}. (2.1)
This is the maximum price an agent is willing to pay for a bet which pays
out X. The sell function SellR : X → R is given by
SellR(X) := min{α ∈ R : R(α−X) = 1}. (2.2)
This is the minimum price an agent is willing to sell the bet which pays out
X.
The buy and sell function have the following relation:
BuyR(X) = max{α ∈ R : R(X − α) = 1}
= max{−α ∈ R : R(X + α) = 1}
= −min{α ∈ R : R(α− (−X)) = 1}
= −SellR(−X).
(2.3)
This shows how buy and sell functions are dual in the sense that BuyR is
completely determined by SellR and vice versa. This relation between Buy
and Sell is precisely the relation between lower and upper previsions in [16],
but in our case the relation follows from the underlying concept of a betting
function. Note that we can recover R from BuyR, since
R(X) =
{
1 if BuyR(X) ≥ 0,
0 if BuyR(X) < 0.
(2.4)
Definition 2.3. Let R : X → {0, 1} be a betting function. Then R is said
to be coherent if
(R1) If X > 0, then R(X) = 1;
(R2) R(λX) = R(X) for every λ > 0;
(R3) If R(X) = R(Y ) = 1, then R(X + Y ) = 1.
These conditions do not necessarily capture everything a reasonable
agent should adhere to, and for rational behavior more is needed as we
will see. However, the conditions formulate the very basics. Condition (R1)
says that agents should be willing to accept bets with guaranteed positive
results. Condition (R2) says that willingness to accept bets should only
depend on the relative sizes of the results, but not on their absolute sizes.
Condition (R3) says that if an agent is willing to accept two bet, (s)he should
be willing to accept bets simultaneously. We want to point out that both
condition (R2) and (R3) have a debatable consequence: if an agent is willing
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to accept a bet in which (s)he wins 1 euro if A is true and loses 1 euro if
A is false, then (s)he) should be willing to accept a bet in which (s)he wins
1 million euro if A is true and loses 1 million euro if A is false. In the real
world, one could think of all kinds of reasons why an agent would not want
to accept the second bet, even if (s)he is willing to accept the first one. By
imposing coherence, we thus consider highly idealized agents.
The following result says that BuyR is coherent as a lower prevision in
the sense of Walley [16] if and only if R is coherent in the sense of Definition
2.3.
Theorem 2.4. Let R : X → {0, 1} be a betting function. Then R is coherent
if and only if
• BuyR(X) ≥ minX;
• BuyR(λX) = λBuyR(X) for every λ > 0;
• BuyR(X + Y ) ≥ BuyR(X) + BuyR(Y ).
Proof. Suppose R is coherent. By (R1), we have that R(X−minX+ ǫ) = 1
for every ǫ > 0. Hence
BuyR(X) = max{α ∈ R : R(X − α) = 1} ≥ minX − ǫ (2.5)
for every ǫ > 0, so BuyR(X) ≥ minX. By (R2), we have for every λ > 0
that
BuyR(λX) = max{α ∈ R : R(λX − α) = 1}
= max{α ∈ R : R(X −
α
λ
) = 1}
= max{λα ∈ R : R(X − α) = 1}
= λmax{α ∈ R : R(X − α) = 1}
= λBuyR(X).
(2.6)
Suppose that, for some α, β ∈ R, we have R(X −α) = 1 and R(Y − β) = 1.
Then, by (R3), we have R(X + Y − α− β) = 1 and thus
BuyR(X + Y ) = max{γ ∈ R : R(X + Y − γ) = 1} ≥ α+ β. (2.7)
It follows that
BuyR(X + Y ) ≥ max{α : R(X − α) = 1}+max{β : R(X − β) = 1}
= BuyR(X) + BuyR(Y ).
(2.8)
For the converse, suppose that BuyR has the listed properties. We set
ψ : R→ {0, 1} by
ψ(x) =
{
1 if x ≥ 0,
0 if x < 0,
(2.9)
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and we note as before that
R(X) = ψ(BuyR(X)). (2.10)
If X > 0, then BuyR(X) ≥ 0 by the first property. Hence R(X) =
ψ(BuyR(X)) = 1. So (R1) holds.
The second property tells us that, for every λ > 0, we have
R(λX) = ψ(BuyR(λX)) = ψ(λBuyR(X)) = ψ(BuyR(X)) = R(X), (2.11)
so (R2) holds.
By the third property, we have
R(X + Y ) = ψ(BuyR(X + Y ))
≥ ψ(BuyR(X) + BuyR(Y ))
≥ min{ψ(BuyR(X)), ψ(BuyR(Y ))}
= min{R(X), R(Y )}.
(2.12)
Hence if R(X) = R(Y ) = 1, it follows that R(X+Y ) = 1, so (R3) holds.
The second and third property of Theorem 2.4 tell us that BuyR is a
super-linear functional if R is coherent. Coherence of R can of course also
be captured in terms of SellR:
Theorem 2.5. Let R : X → {0, 1} be a betting function. Then R is coherent
if and only if
• SellR(X) ≤ maxX;
• SellR(λX) = λSellR(X) for every λ > 0;
• SellR(X + Y ) ≤ SellR(X) + SellR(Y ).
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 2.4 and the relation between
BuyR and SellR.
We want to measure the degree to which an agent believes A ⊆ Ω by
the willingness to accept a bet with a desirable result if A is true and an
undesirable result if A is false. The actions that have a desirable result if A is
true and an undesirable result if A is false, are buying the bet 1A and selling
the bet 1Ac . It is willingness to buy 1A for a high price and willingness to
sell 1Ac for a low price, that shows a high degree of belief in A. This leads
to our definition of degree of belief.
Definition 2.6 (Degree of belief). Let R be the coherent betting function
of an agent. We define the degree to which this agent believes an event
A ⊆ Ω as BuyR(1A) = 1− SellR(1Ac).
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3 Adding B-consistency
In this section, we introduce an additional condition for betting functions
and show that this constraint precisely leads to buy functions which are
belief functions when restricted to bets of the form 1A, with A ⊂ Ω. Before
we do this, however, we will briefly discuss how our setup relates to the
Dutch Book argument for probability distributions.
The Dutch Book argument is centered around the principle that betting
behavior of agents should not lead to sure loss. The following theorem tells
us that not having a sure loss is already implied by coherence. This theorem
is well known within Walley’s theory, but we give our version of the proof
as a service to the reader.
Theorem 3.1. If R is a coherent betting function, then
max
ω∈Ω

 N∑
i=1
(Xi − BuyR(Xi)) +
M∑
j=1
(SellR(Yj)− Yj)

 ≥ 0 (3.1)
for all X1, . . . ,XN ∈ X and Y1, . . . , YM ∈ X .
Proof. We first show that BuyR(X) ≤ maxX for each X ∈ X . Suppose
that BuyR(X) > maxX. This means there is an ǫ > 0 such that
R(X −maxX − ǫ) = 1. (3.2)
Note that for every Y ∈ X , there is a λ > 0 such that λ(X−maxX−ǫ) < Y .
Since R(λ(X −maxX − ǫ)) = 1 by (R2) and R(Y −λ(X −maxX − ǫ)) = 1
by (R1), it follows with (R3) that R(Y ) = 1. Hence R(Y ) = 1 for all Y ∈ X ,
but then there is no maximum α ∈ R such that R(Y − α) = 1. This is a
contradiction, and it follows that BuyR(X) ≤ maxX.
Now let X1, . . . ,XN ∈ X and Y1, . . . , YM ∈ X . By using Theorem 2.4
and the property we just proved, we find
N∑
i=1
BuyR(Xi)−
M∑
j=1
SellR(Yj) =
N∑
i=1
BuyR(Xi) +
M∑
j=1
BuyR(−Yj)
≤ BuyR

 N∑
i=1
Xi +
M∑
j=1
−Yj


≤ max

 N∑
i=1
Xi +
M∑
j=1
−Yj

 .
(3.3)
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Theorem 3.1 tells us that coherence is stronger than having no sure
loss. At the same time, even coherence does not imply that A 7→ BuyR(1A)
is a probability distribution: it is clear that the collection of maps A 7→
BuyR(1A) for coherent R, is much richer than only probability distributions.
This tells us that the property that BuyR(1A) = SellR(1A) for every A ⊆ Ω,
which is usually implicitly assumed when the Dutch Book argument is laid
out, is crucial for the restriction to probability distributions. The next
theorem confirms this.
Theorem 3.2. P is a probability distribution if and only if there exists a
coherent betting function R such that P (A) = BuyR(1A) = SellR(1A).
Proof. Suppose there is a coherent R such that P (A) = BuyR(1A) =
SellR(1A). We have P (Ω) = BuyR(1Ω) = 1 and P (A) = BuyR(1A) ≥ 0
by coherence. Then for disjoint A,B ⊆ Ω we find
P (A∪B) = BuyR(1A+1B) ≥ BuyR(1A)+BuyR(1B) = P (A)+P (B) (3.4)
and
P (A∪B) = SellR(1A+1B) ≤ SellR(1A)+BuyR(1B) = P (A)+P (B). (3.5)
Hence P is additive.
For the converse, suppose that P is a probability distribution. Then
define
BuyR(X) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})X(ω). (3.6)
Clearly, R is coherent and we have BuyR(X) = SellR(X).
As we already mentioned, the constraint that BuyR(1A) = SellR(1A)
for every A ⊆ Ω, is precisely one we do not want to impose. This property,
however, is not easily weakened in a reasonable way. Therefore, we will work
towards another characterization of probability distributions (Theorem 3.7),
from which we can derive our constraint. We start with the definition of a
belief valuation.
Definition 3.3. A function B : 2Ω → {0, 1} is called a belief valuation
provided that
• B(Ac) = 0 if B(A) = 1;
• If B(A) = 1 and A ⊆ B, then B(B) = 1;
• If B(A) = 1 and B(B) = 1, then B(A ∩B) = 1;
• B(Ω) = 1.
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A belief valuation is also called a categorical belief function or a 0-1
necessity measure in the literature. In practice, we use the characterization
that B is a belief valuation if and only if there is a nonempty set EB ⊆ Ω
such that
B(A) =
{
1 if EB ⊆ A
0 otherwise
. (3.7)
We can also describe belief valuations in terms of filters, since B is a belief
valuation if and only if
{A ⊆ Ω : B(A) = 1} ⊆ 2Ω (3.8)
is a proper filter of subsets of Ω. This filter can be interpreted as the
collection of sets in which an agent has full belief. The next result makes this
precise. For R a coherent betting function, we denote by BR : 2
Ω → {0, 1}
the function that satisfies BR(A) = 1 if and only if BuyR(1A) = 1.
Theorem 3.4. A function B : 2Ω → {0, 1} is a belief valuation if and only
if there is a coherent betting function R such that B = BR.
Proof. Suppose first that B is a belief valuation. We define R by
BuyR(X) := min
ω∈EB
X(ω).
Clearly R is coherent and it follows from the definition of BR that BR = B.
For the converse, suppose that R is a coherent betting function. We check
that BR is a belief valuation. Since BuyR(1Ω) = 1 we have BR(Ω) = 1. The
second property in Definition 3.3 follows immediately from the monotonicity
of BuyR. If BuyR(A) = BuyR(B) = 1, then
BuyR(1A∩B) = BuyR(1A + 1B − 1A∪B)
≥ BuyR(1A) + BuyR(1B) + BuyR(−1A∪B) ≥ 1,
so BuyR(1A∩B) = 1. Finally, if BR(A) = 1, then since
1 = BuyR(1A + 1Ac) ≥ BuyR(1A) + BuyR(1Ac),
it follows that BuyR(1Ac) = 0.
A belief valuation should be compared with the classical notion of a truth
valuation. The definition of a truth valuation T : 2Ω → {0, 1} is similar to
the definition of a belief valuation, the only difference being that in the first
bullet, ‘if’ is replaced by ‘if and only if’. Hence a truth valuation is a special
belief valuation, namely one that corresponds to a proper ultrafilter of sets.
Truth valuations are precisely those belief valuations B for which EB is a
singleton. A major difference between truth and belief is that if an agent
does not believe in A, this does not imply that (s)he does believe in Ac.
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As a result, the implication in the first bullet in the definition of a belief
valuation goes in one direction only.
Given a belief valuation B and a set S ⊆ Ω for which B(S) = 1, the
agent fully believes that a bet X ∈ X has a revenue of at least
min
ω∈S
X(ω). (3.9)
Since this holds for all S for which B(S) = 1, this leads to the definition of
guaranteed revenue.
Definition 3.5. For any belief valuation B, the guaranteed revenue GB :
X → R is defined as
GB(X) = max
A:B(A)=1
min
ω∈A
X(ω).
Since we have that B(A) = 1 if and only if EB ⊆ A, we can express the
guaranteed revenue as
GB(X) = min
ω∈EB
X(ω). (3.10)
To benchmark and motivate our main result Theorem 3.10 below we now
first show how classical probability distributions can be characterized with
the notion of guaranteed revenue.
Definition 3.6. A betting function R is P-consistent if and only if, for all
X1, . . . ,XN and Y1, . . . , YM such that
GB
(
N∑
i=1
Xi
)
≤ GB

 M∑
j=1
Yj

 (3.11)
for every belief valuation B, we have
N∑
i=1
BuyR(Xi) ≤
M∑
j=1
BuyR(Yj). (3.12)
Theorem 3.7. P is a probability distribution if and only if there exists a
coherent and P-consistent R such that P (A) = BuyR(1A).
In words, this result says that if the guaranteed revenue of one collection
of bets is larger than the guaranteed revenue of a second collection of bets,
then the agent should be willing to pay more for the second collection.
The proof of the theorem below reveals that the statement of the theorem
is, strictly speaking, overly complicated. Indeed, if we would leave out GB
everywhere, the ensuing result would still be true, and probably easier to
interpret: the theorem would say that if one collection of bets always pays
out more than a second collection, an agent would be willing to pay more
for the first collection. We have chosen for the current formulation since this
formulation points the way for the necessary changes.
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Proof. (of Theorem 3.7.) First suppose that R is coherent, P-consistent and
that P (A) = BuyR(1A). Suppose A ∩B = ∅. Then
GB(1A + 1B) = GB(1A∪B) (3.13)
for every B, so by P-consistency we have
BuyR(1A + 1B) = BuyR(1A) + BuyR(1B). (3.14)
Hence P (A ∪ B) = P (A) + P (B). Since R is coherent, we have P (Ω) =
BuyR(1Ω) = 1 and it follows that P is a probability distribution.
Now suppose that P is a probability distribution. We define R by
BuyR(X) :=
∑
ω∈Ω
X(ω)P ({ω}). (3.15)
Clearly BuyR(1A) = P (A), and it follows from Theorem 2.4 that R is
coherent. Now suppose that
GB
(
N∑
i=1
Xi
)
≤ GB

 M∑
j=1
Yj

 (3.16)
for every belief valuation B. For every ω ∈ Ω, the map Bω(A) := 1A(ω) is a
belief valuation. Note that GBω (X) = X(ω), so (3.16) implies that
N∑
i=1
Xi ≤
M∑
j=1
Yj. (3.17)
Hence, by our definition of BuyR:
N∑
i=1
BuyR(Xi) = BuyR
(
N∑
i=1
Xi
)
≤ BuyR

 M∑
j=1
Yj


=
M∑
j=1
BuyR(Yj).
(3.18)
So R is P-consistent.
Although we do not deny that the notion of P-consistency is in some
sense a reasonable requirement for collections of bets, there is, from the
point of view of epistemic probability, a problem with it. Whereas in (3.11)
the guaranteed revenues of the combined bets are compared, in (3.12) the
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sums of the buy prices of the individual bets are compared. This observation
goes back to the heart of the problem with the use of classical probability
distributions for epistemic purposes: the guaranteed revenue of the combined
bets 1A and 1
c
A is - of course - the same as the guaranteed revenue of the bet
1, under any belief valuation. But this should not have any direct implication
for the maximum price for which an agent would be willing to buy 1A or 1
c
A
individually.
This suggests that for epistemic purposes, we should change P-consistency
in one of the following two ways: in (3.11) the sums of the guaranteed
revenues of the individual bets should be compared, or in (3.12) the buy
prices of the combined bets should be compared. The first option leads to
our definition of B-consistency.
Definition 3.8. A betting function R is B-consistent if for all X1, . . . ,XN
and Y1, . . . , YM such that
N∑
i=1
GB(Xi) ≤
M∑
j=1
GB(Yj) (3.19)
for every belief valuation B, we have
N∑
i=1
BuyR(Xi) ≤
M∑
j=1
BuyR(Yj). (3.20)
There is a simple reason for this choice. Indeed, the alternative would
result in the constraint that if GB(
∑
iXi) ≤ GB(
∑
j Yj) for every belief
valuation B, then BuyR(
∑
Xi) ≤ BuyR(
∑
j Yj). This constraint, however,
is simply B-consistency for N =M = 1.
Hence, the notion of B-consistency differs from P-consistency in the sense
that we compare the correct quantities: we compare sums of guaranteed
revenues of individual (collective) bets to sums of buy prices of individual
(collective) bets.
The next example illustrates that not every coherent betting function is
B-consistent.
Example 3.9. Suppose Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4} and that R is given by
BuyR(X) = min
{
1
2
2∑
i=1
X(i),
1
4
4∑
i=1
X(i)
}
. (3.21)
It is easy to check that R is coherent, and that for all belief valuations B we
have
GB(1{2,3,4}) +GB(1{2}) ≥ GB(1{2,3}) +GB(1{2,4}), (3.22)
but
BuyR(1{2,3,4})+BuyR(1{2}) =
3
4
< 1 = BuyR(1{2,3})+BuyR(1{2,4}). (3.23)
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With the notion of B-consistency we can now state and prove our main
result. The following theorem constitutes our behavioral interpretation of
belief functions. It shows that only B-consistency is needed to guarantee that
a lower prevision in the sense of Walley [16] is in fact a belief function and
that every belief function can be obtained this way. The result legitimizes
the use of belief functions for modelling epistemic probability.
Theorem 3.10. Bel is a belief function if and only if there exists a coherent
and B-consistent R such that Bel(A) = BuyR(1A).
This result follows immediately from the following theorem which is
interesting in its own right and characterizes B-consistency for coherent
betting functions.
Theorem 3.11. Let R be a coherent betting function. Then R is B-
consistent if and only if there is a basic belief assignment m such that
BuyR(X) =
∑
S⊆Ω
m(S)min
ω∈S
X(ω) (3.24)
for all X ∈ X .
The expression in (3.24) is known as the Choquet integral of X with
respect to the belief function that corresponds to m (see for instance [7]),
and is also called the lower expectation of X (see for instance [13]). Hence,
another way of phrasing Theorem 3.11 is that R is B-consistent if and only
if Bel(A) := BuyR(1A) is a belief function and BuyR(X) is given by the
Choquet integral of X with respect to Bel. We now give the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.11. First suppose that there is a basic belief assignment
m such that
BuyR(X) =
∑
S⊆Ω
m(S)min
ω∈S
X(ω)
for all X ∈ X . Also suppose that for X1, . . . ,XN , Y1, . . . , YM ∈ X we have
N∑
i=1
min
ω∈S
Xi(ω) ≤
M∑
j=1
min
ω∈S
Yj(ω) (3.25)
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for every nonempty S ⊆ Ω. Then
N∑
i=1
BuyR(Xi) =
N∑
i=1
∑
S⊆Ω
m(S)min
ω∈S
Xi(ω)
=
∑
S⊆Ω
m(S)
N∑
i=1
min
ω∈S
Xi(ω)
≤
∑
S⊆Ω
m(S)
M∑
j=1
min
ω∈S
Yj(ω)
=
M∑
j=1
BuyR(Yj).
(3.26)
Hence R is B-consistent.
For the converse of the theorem, suppose that R is B-consistent. First
we show that Bel(A) := BuyR(1A) is a belief function. Clearly we have
GB(1A) = B(A), (3.27)
and since B is a belief function, we have
B
(
N⋃
i=1
Ai
)
+
∑
I⊆{1,...,n}
I 6=∅,|I| even
B
(⋂
i∈I
Ai
)
≥
∑
I⊆{1,...,n}
I 6=∅,|I| odd
B
(⋂
i∈I
Ai
)
. (3.28)
So by B-consistency, we have
Bel
(
N⋃
i=1
Ai
)
+
∑
I⊆{1,...,n}
I 6=∅,|I| even
Bel
(⋂
i∈I
Ai
)
≥
∑
I⊆{1,...,n}
I 6=∅,|I| odd
Bel
(⋂
i∈I
Ai
)
, (3.29)
and it follows that Bel is a belief function.
Since Bel is a belief function, there is a m : 2Ω → [0, 1] with m(∅) = 0
such that
Bel(A) =
∑
S⊆A
m(S). (3.30)
Now let X ∈ X . We write X(Ω) = {y1, . . . , yK} where y1 < yk < . . . < yK .
Set y0 := 0. It is well known that the Choquet integral ofX can be expressed
as ∑
S⊆Ω
m(S)min
ω∈S
X(ω) =
K∑
j=1
(yj − yj−1)Bel({X ≥ yj}). (3.31)
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We have
K∑
k=1
min
ω∈S
(yk − yk−1)1{X≥yk}(ω) =
K∑
k=1
(yk − yk−1)1(S ⊆ {X ≥ yk})
= min
ω∈S
X(ω).
(3.32)
So by B-consistency we find that
K∑
k=1
BuyR((yk − yk−1)1{X≥yk})) = BuyR(X). (3.33)
Now it follows with (3.31), (3.33) and coherence of R that
BuyR(X) =
∑
S⊆Ω
m(S)min
ω∈S
X(ω). (3.34)
4 Discussion
We have first argued that the classical axioms of Kolmogorov are not suitable
for modeling epistemic probability. This has been known for a long time,
and researchers like Glenn Shafer and Peter Walley have developed a general
theory of belief functions, respectively lower provisions, as an alternative for
classical probability theory in an epistemological context.
The theory of belief functions was never picked up in mainstream
probability. One of the reasons for this was the lack of a clear behavioral
interpretation of belief functions, analogous to the betting interpretation
of probabilities. In this paper we have developed such a behavioral
interpretation. We have embedded belief functions in a betting context,
and we have shown that belief functions arise precisely when we add B-
consistency to the coherent lower previsions in the theory of Walley. In this
way, not only do we provide a behavioral interpretation of belief functions,
but we also make a natural connection between the theory of Walley and
the theory of Shafer.
Of course adding B-consistency calls for an argument why a rational
agent should adhere to it. We think it is not controversial to say that
no guaranteed losses (Theorem 3.1) is the bottom line for any reasonable
constraint. Beyond that things are, of course, debatable. Our argument to
restrict the lower previsions of Walley to B-consistency is derived from the
way we obtained it, namely by altering P-consistency in a very reasonable
way. If a collection of bets is in some sense guaranteed to be better than
another collection of bets, then the total price should be higher. The point is
now how “better” should be formulated. When compared to P-consistency,
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B-consistency allows for all the flexibility of epistemic probability that we
asked for in the introduction. Indeed, note that it is possible to setm(Ω) = 1,
which corresponds to total ignorance apart from the fact that the outcome
is in Ω. We think it is rational to compare collection of bets from the
viewpoint of total guaranteed revenue, and to be willing to pay more when
this quantity increases. As such, we think that B-consistency is a very
reasonable constraint for a rational agent to adhere to.
But there is more than philosophy, of course. We also want a theory that
is practical and relatively easy to apply. Belief functions are close to classical
probabilities since they are determined by basic belief assignments. As such,
we think they are much more practical and easier to use than coherent
lower previsions. Indeed, in practical situations, one does not directly use
constraints as coherence or B-consistency to construct a buy function. In
case of belief functions, one typically proceeds by constructing a suitable
basic belief assignment, see for instance our paper [8] in which we apply belief
functions in the classical forensic context of the so called island problem,
precisely by setting up appropriate basic belief assignments. This is very
much akin the classical situation: not many people use characterizations like
P-consistency (or related characterizations) to set up a probability measure,
but it is reassuring that such characterizations exist. Hence we should view
B-consistency as a theoretical underpinning for why to use belief functions,
but not as a tool that is used in practice to construct belief functions.
Last but not least, we mention conditional belief functions, a notion
which we have not introduced in the current paper. Shafer originally based
his notion of conditional belief on the so called Dempster rule of combination,
a rule that has been criticized fiercely, see e.g. [9, 4]. In a forthcoming
paper we will discuss conditional beliefs from the perspective of the current
betting interpretation. It turns out that there are various ways to do this,
depending on the precise epistemological situation, and this fact adds to
the suitableness of belief functions to model epistemic uncertainty. Another
natural line of research is to further develop the theory of belief functions
in infinite spaces, an enterprise that already has obtained some attention in
e.g. [15].
Acknowledgement: We thank an anonymous referee for valuable com-
ments, most notably for his/her suggestion to relate our results to the theory
of Peter Walley.
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